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We investigate two directions beyond the traditional quantum secret sharing (QSS). First, a
restriction on QSS that comes from the no-cloning theorem is that any pair of authorized sets in
an access structure should overlap. From the viewpoint of application, this places an unnatural
constraint on secret sharing. We present a generalization, called assisted QSS (AQSS), where access
structures without pairwise overlap of authorized sets is permissible, provided some shares are
withheld by the share dealer. We show that no more than λ − 1 withheld shares are required,
where λ is the minimum number of partially linked classes among the authorized sets for the QSS.
Our result means that such applications of QSS need not be thwarted by the no-cloning theorem.
Secondly, we point out a way of combining the features of QSS and quantum key distribution (QKD)
for applications where a classical information is shared by quantum means. We observe that in such
case, it is often possible to reduce the security proof of QSS to that of QKD.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose the president of a bank, Alice, wants to give access to a vault to two vice-presidents, Bob and Charlie,
whom she does not entirely trust. Instead of giving the combination to any one of them, she may desire to distribute
the information in such a way that no vice-president alone has any knowledge of the combination, but both of them
can jointly determine the combination. Cryptography provides the answer to this question in the form of secret
sharing [1]. In this scheme, some sensitive data is distributed among a number of parties such that certain authorized
sets of parties can access the data, but no other combination of players. A particularly symmetric variety of secret
splitting (sharing) is called a threshold scheme: in a (k, n) classical threshold scheme (CTS), the secret is split up
into n pieces (shares), of which any k shares form a set authorized to reconstruct the secret, while any set of k− 1 or
fewer shares has no information about the secret. Blakely [2] and Shamir [3] showed that CTS’s exist for all values of
k and n with n ≥ k. By concatenating threshold schemes, one can construct arbitrary access structures, subject only
to the condition of monotonicity (ie., sets containing authorized sets should also be authorized) [4]. Hillery et al. [5]
and Karlsson et al. [6] proposed methods for implementing CTSs that use quantum information to transmit shares
securely in the presence of eavesdroppers.
Subsequently, extending the above idea to the quantum case, Cleve, Gottesman and Lo [7], using the notion of
quantum erasure correction [8, 9, 10], presented a (k, n) quantum threshold scheme (QTS) as a method to split up
an unknown secret quantum state |S〉 into n pieces (shares) with the restriction that k > n/2– this inequality being
needed to ensure that no two disjoint sets of players should be able to reconstruct the secret, in conformance with
the quantum no-cloning theorem [11]. QSS has been extended beyond QTS to general access structures [12, 13], but
here none of the authorized sets shall be mutually disjoint: given a QSS access structure Γ = {α1, · · · , αr} over N
players, the no-cloning restriction entails that:
αj ∩ αk 6= φ ∀j, k. (1)
Potential applications of QSS include creating joint checking accounts containing quantum money [14], or sharing hard-
to-create ancilla states [12], or performing secure distributed quantum computation [15]. A tri-qubit QSS scheme has
recently been implemented [16]. The chances of practical implementation of QSS are improved by employing equivalent
schemes that maximize the proportion of classical information processing [17, 18]. It has been shown that quantum
teleportation [19] and entanglement swapping [20, 21] may be used to implement an ((n, n))-threshold scheme.
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2The requirement Eq. (1) places a restriction quite unnatural to applications, where we may more likely expect to
find groups of people with mutual trust within the group, and hardly any outside it. First aspect of our present work
is aimed at studying a way to overcome this limitation. In particular, in the Sections II and III we show that allowing
the dealer to withhold a small number of shares permits arbitrary access structures to be acceptable, subject only to
monotonicity. This modified scheme we call “assisted QSS” (AQSS), the shares withheld by the dealer being called
“home shares”. While more general than conventional QSS, AQSS is clearly not as general as classical secret sharing,
since it requires shares given to the (non-dealer) players, called “player shares”, to be combined with the home shares
for reconstructing the secret.
Inspite of this limitation, the modified scheme can be useful in some applications of secret sharing, in particular,
those in which the secret dealer is by definition a trusted party and where reconstruction of the secret effectively
occurs by re-convergence of shares at the dealer’s station. Further, it could be useful for schemes like circular QSS
[22].
We note that the home share by themselves give no information. In the bank example above, access is allowed
by the bank vault (which can be thought of effectively as the dealer, acting as the bank president’s proxy) if the
secret reconstructed from the vice-presidents’ shares is the required password. The locker thus effectively serves as
both the dealer and site of secret reconstruction. In AQSS, the player shares are combined with the home share(s) to
reconstruct the secret. Clearly, this leads to no loss of generality in this type of QSS. Where the secret dealer is not
necessarily trusted, such as in multi-party secure computation (MPSC), AQSS may be less useful, though here again
only a more detailed study can tell whether MPSC cannot be turned into a suitable variant of AQSS.
It is assumed that all the n (quantum) shares are somehow divided among the N players. In an AQSS scheme,m < n
shares are allowed to remain with the share dealer, as home shares. In order that AQSS should depart minimally
from conventional QSS, we further require that the number of home shares should be the minimum possible such that
a violation of Eq. (1) can be accomodated. Thus, a conventional QSS access structure like Γ = {ABC,ADE,BDF},
which as such conforms to the no-cloning theorem, will require no share assistance. A conventional QSS scheme is a
special case of AQSS, in which the set of home shares is empty. We prove by direct construction that, by allowing
for non-zero home shares, the restriction (1) does not apply to AQSS. Therefore, with share assistance, the only
restriction on the access structure Γ in AQSS is monotonicity, as with classical secret sharing. Such constructions are
described in details in the Sections II and III.
Another cryptographic primitive where (multipartite) entanglement can be effectively used is that of quantum key
distribution (QKD) [23, 24] and its generalization to n parties (n-QKD). Note that the n-QKD involves sharing
a random key amongst n trustworthy parties unlike QSS which splits quantum information among untrustworthy
parties. Naturally, it would be an interesting extension to consider the situations where some kind of mutual trust
may be present between sets of parties while parties being individually mistrustful wherein it might be possible to
combine the essential features of QKD and QSS. In the Section IV, we discuss one such extension. We consider the
problem of secure key distribution between two trustful groups where the invidual group members may be mistrustful.
The two groups retrieve the secure key string, only if all members should cooperate with one another in each group.
That is, how the two groups one of size k and the other of size n − k may share an identical secret key among
themselves while an evesdropper may co-operate with several (of course not all) dishonest members from any of the
groups. If k = 1, the result is equivalent to a (n− 1, n− 1) threshold secret sharing scheme.
The QKD-QSS connection is manifest in several earlier works [5, 22, 25]. Ref. [5] first introduced the idea of
using a GHZ to implement a three-party secret sharing protocol. Ref. [25] extend a method of QKD with reusable
entanglement [26] to QSS. Deng et al. [22] extend the ping-pong QKD protocol [27] to a three-party circular QSS
scheme. Ref. [28] presents a security for a (n, n) scheme involving on n-partite entangled states, based on the violation
of Bell’s inequalities, even when the n-qubit correlations are weak. In contrast, we employ only bipartite states. From
the theoretical perspective, this will provide the simplicity that we can build the our protocol on top of QKD, which
will help us reduce the security of our scheme to that of QKD. From a practical perspective, multipartite states
employed for QSS above has exponentially low efficiency even in the noiseless scheme, since only rounds in which all
participants measure the same observable, σx or σy, are retained, with all other measurement possibilities discarded.
In contrast, in our protocol, the key generation step will involve a measurement by all parties in the diagonal basis,
so that no waste bits are produced through incompatible measurements by the various parties.
II. PARTIAL LINK CLASSIFICATION
Given access structure Γ = {α1, · · · , αr}, we divide all authorized sets αj into partially linked classes, each of which
is characterized by the following two properties: (a) Eq. (1) is satisfied if αj , αk belong to the same class; (b) for any
two distinct classes, there is at least one pair j, k, where αj belongs to one class and αk to the other, such that Eq.
(1) fails.
3A division of Γ into such classes we call as a partial link classification. The number of classes in a partial link
classification gives its size. In general, neither the combinations nor size of partial link classifications are unique. We
denote the size of the smallest partial link classification for a given Γ by λ. If all authorized sets have mutual pairwise
overlap then λ = 1 and the single partially linked class is, uniquely, Γ itself, and AQSS reduces to conventional QSS.
If none of the αj ’s have mutual pairwise overlap, then λ = r and the r partially linked classes are, uniquely, each αj .
If there are s disconnected groups of αj ’s (that is, Eq. (1) fails for all pairs j, k, where j comes from one group and k
from another) then λ ≥ s. The inequality arises from the fact that there may be more than one partially linked class
within a disconnected group.
The problem of obtaining a partial link classification can be analyzed graph theoretically. It is easy to visualize
Γ as a graph G(V,E), composed of a set V of vertices and set E of edges. The vertices are the authorized sets,
V = {αj} = Γ and edges E = {(αj , αk)} correspond to pairs of sets that have pairwise overlap. Such a graph may
be called an access structure graph (AS graph) for Γ. A partial link classification corresponds to a partitioning of
the AS graph G such that each partition is a clique, i.e., a complete subgraph in G (A graph is called complete if its
each vertex has an edge with its every other vertex). Figure 1(a) depicts a conventional QSS, where Γ is partitioned
into a single 5-clique. Figure 1(b) depicts a more general case covered by AQSS, where Γ is partitioned into a pair of
3-cliques or into a triple of 2-cliques. The problem of determining λ is thus equivalent to the combinatorial problem
of partitioning G into the minimum number of cliques. Here it is worth noting that many multi-party problems are
amenable to combinatorial treatment.
Before introducing the main result, it is instructive to look at the classical situation. In our notation, single (double)
parantheses indicate CTS (QTS). For a classical secret sharing scheme, suppose Γ = {ABC,AD,DEF}, which can
be written in the normal form {(A AND B AND C) OR (A AND D) OR (D AND E AND F)}. The AND gate
corresponds to a (|αj |, |αj |) threshold scheme, while OR to a (1,2) threshold scheme. By concatenating these two
layers, we get a construction for Γ. In the conventional QSS, the above fails for two reasons, both connected to the
no-cloning theorem: the members of Γ should not be disjoint; and further there is no ((1, 2)) scheme.
However, we can replace ((1, 2)) by a ((2, 3)) scheme, which corresponds to a majority function of OR. In general,
we replace a ((1, r)) scheme by a ((r, 2r − 1)) scheme. r of the shares correspond to individual authorized sets in Γ,
shared within an αj according to a ((|αj |, |αj |)) threshold scheme, and, recursively, the other r − 1 shares are shared
according to a pure state scheme that implements a maximal structure Γmax that includes Γ (obtained by adding
authorized sets to Γ until the complement of every unauthorized set is precisely an authorized set) [12]. Theorem 1
below extends this idea to the situation where Γ does not satisfy Eq. (1).
Theorem 1 Given an access structure Γ = {α1, α2, · · · , αr} with a minimum of λ partially linked classes among a
set of players P = {P1, P2, · · · , PN}, an assisted quantum secret sharing scheme exists iff Γ is monotone. It requires
no more than λ− 1 home shares.
Proof. It is known that if λ = 1, then there exists a conventional QSS to realize it [12]. Suppose λ > 1. To implement
Γ (which represents a monotonic access structure), the dealer first employs a ((λ, 2λ−1)) majority function, assigning
one share to each class. Recursively, each share is then subjected to a conventional QSS within each class. The
remaining λ − 1 shares remain as home shares with the dealer. To reconstruct the secret, any authorized set can
reconstruct the share assigned to its class, which, combined with the home shares, is sufficient for the purpose. Clearly,
since the necessity of the home share by itself fulfils the no-cloning theorem, authorized sets are not required to be
mutually overlapping. Thus monotonicity is the only constraint. 
Some corrolories of the theorem are worth noting. First is that the number (= λ− 1) of home shares is strictly less
than the number (≥ N ≥ λ) of player shares. A share q is ‘important’ if there is an unauthorized set T such that
T ∪{q} is authorized. From the fact the Theorem uses a threshold scheme (the ((λ, 2λ− 1)) scheme) in the first layer,
it follows that all the home shares are important.
As an illustration of Theorem 1, we consider the access structure Γ = {ABC,BD,EFG}, for which λ = 2. In
the first layer, a ((2, 3)) scheme is employed to split |S〉 into three shares, with one share designated to the class
C1 ≡ {ABC,BD} and the other to C2 ≡ {EFG}. The last remains with the dealer. In the second layer, the first
share is split-shared among members of C1 according to a conventional QSS scheme. The second share is split-shared
among players of C2 according to a ((3, 3)) scheme. Diagrammatically, this can be depicted as follows.
((2, 3))


((2, 3)) :


((3, 3)) : A,B,C
((2, 2)) : B,D
|S′〉
((3, 3)) : E,F,G
((1, 1)) : dealer
(2)
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ε
δχ
β
α φ
FIG. 1: The vertices represent authorized sets, the edges depict a non-vanishing pairwise overlap between two authorized sets.
Figure (a) represents a conventional QSS, where all sets have pairwise overlap, meaning that the AS graph is complete, so
that λ = 1. Figure (b) represents a situation where this does not hold and hence λ > 1. The authorized sets are labelled
{α, β, χ, ǫ, δ, φ}. The dashed line is a cut leading to two partially linked classes (the pair of 3-cliques, {α, β, χ} and {δ, ǫ, φ}), so
that λ = 2. The two dash-dotted lines are system of two cuts leading to three partially linked classes (the triple of 2-cliques,
{α, β}, {χ, δ} and {ǫ, φ}).
Note that given any Γ, even with disconnected elements, (so that the AS graph is not connected), there is an
AQSS by simply adding a common player to all authorized sets, and designating him to be the dealer: eg., Γ =
{ABC,DE,FGH} giving Γ′ = {ABCX,DEX,FGHX}, where shares to X would be designated as home shares.
Thereby, the structure Γ = Γ′|X , which denotes a restriction of Γ′ to members other than X , is effectively realized
among the other players. However, this is not an efficient AQSS scheme because the number of resultant home shares
are non-minimal, at least according to the recursive scheme outlined above. In all it would require 3 + 2x shares,
where x is the number of instances in which X appears in a maximal structure Γ′max that includes Γ
′. More generally,
the requirement is a minimum of r + (r − 1)x home shares, where r is the number of authorized sets in Γ. A better
method is for the dealer to employ a pure state scheme that implements Γ′max, retain all shares corresponding to X
while discarding all those corresponding to sets in Γ′max − Γ′. In all this would require 3 shares, or, in general, r
shares. Better still, according to Theorem 1, no more than λ − 1 = 2 home shares are needed. Clearly, in general,
λ− 1 < r. These considerations suggest that λ(Γ) − 1 is the minimal number of home shares required to implement
a QSS for Γ. We conjecture that this is indeed the case.
III. AQSS WITH QUANTUM ENCRYPTION
Finally, we note that practical AQSS can be made highly efficient in terms of using quantum resources by employing
quantum encryption. Indeed, it is quite useful in QSS even outside the AQSS paradigm [17, 18]. Quantum encryption
works as follows: suppose we have a n-qubit quantum state |ψ〉 and a random sequence K of 2n classical bits. Each
sequential pair of classical bit is associated with a qubit and determines which transformation σˆ ∈ I, σˆx, σˆy, σˆz is
applied to the respective qubit. If the pair is 00, I is applied, if it is 01, σˆx is applied, and so on. To one not knowing
K, the resulting |ψ˜〉 is a complete mixture and no information can be extracted out of it because the encryption leaves
any pure state in a maximally mixed state, that is: (1/4)(Iˆ|S〉〈S|Iˆ+ σˆx|S〉〈S|σˆx+ σˆy|S〉〈S|σˆy+ σˆz|S〉〈S|σˆz) = (1/2)Iˆ,
for any |S〉. However, with knowledge of K the sequence of operations can be reversed and |ψ〉 recovered. Therefore,
classical data can be used to encrypt quantum data.
In general, given d-dimensional objects, quantum encryption requires d2 operators and a key of 2 log(d) bits per
object to randomize perfectly [29]. In practice, such quantum operations may prove costly, and only near-perfect
security may be sufficient. In this case, there exists a set of roughly d log(d) unitary operators whose average effect on
every input pure state is almost perfectly randomizing, so that the size of the key can be reduced by about a factor
of two [30].
The idea is quite simple: to share a quantum secret |ψ〉 according to access structure Γ, which does not necessarily
satisfy the no-cloning condition, the dealer first encrypts the state to ψ˜〉 using classical bit string K. In the extreme
case, the entire encrypted quantum state is treated as a single home share and transmitted to the reconstructor.
String K is then classically shared according to Γ. Any authorized set α can reconstruct K, and thus |ψ〉, at the
reconstructor’s location.
The above AQSS scheme with quantum encryption is much simpler than that based on partial linked classes
proposed in Section II, however it is interesting to note that the later scheme is stronger in the sense that the dealer
5(reconstructor) can give his all shares to some third party which might be untrustworthy and the secret still remains
hidden even if all classical information leaks. Giving away the shares to third party is good from practical point of
view as the dealer (reconstructor) might be limited by quantum memory requirements.
IV. COMBINING QKD AND QSS
In this section, we discuss our protocol for the two-group QKD - the problem of secure key distribution between
two trustful groups where the invidual group members may be mistrustful. The two groups retrieve the secure key
string, only if all members should cooperate with one another in each group. That is, how the two groups one of
size k and the other of size n − k may share an identical secret key among themselves while an evesdropper may
co-operate with several(of course not all) dishonest members from any of the groups. If k = 1, the result is equivalent
to a (n− 1, n− 1) threshold secret sharing scheme.
Note that the two-group QKD is trivially a classical secret sharing scheme if we involve a trusted third party, say,
Lucy. Lucy will simply generate a random classical bit string. Since it is just a classical information, she makes
two copies of it and splits one each amongst the two groups. Principles of quantum physics allows us, as in the case
of 2-QKD [23, 24], to do away with the third party. We observe that the above problem essentially seems to be a
combination of (a) 2-QKD between the two groups, each group being considered as a single party and (b) secret
sharing in each group among their parties.
Our protocol works in two broad steps. In the first step, the n-partite problem is reduced to a two-party problem
by means of a method for teleporting entanglement [31]. This creates a pure n-partite maximally entangled state
among n-parties, starting from n− 1 EPR pairs shared along a spanning EPR tree, using only O(n) bits of classical
communication. This entanglement teleportation protocol exploits the combinatorial arrangement of EPR pairs to
simplify the task of distributing multipartite entanglement. In the second step, as in case of n-QKD, the Lo-Chau
protocol [24] or Modified Lo-Chau protocol [32] is invoked to prove the unconditional security of sharing nearly perfect
EPR pairs between two parties.
To this end, we will be using a state of the form:
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|00 · · · 0〉+ |11 · · · 1〉), (3)
a maximally entangled n-partite state, represented in the computational basis.
Our protocol is motivated by a simple mathematical property possessed by multi-partite states, unlike EPR pairs,
which forces them to behave differently when measured in computational or diagonal basis. Let H ,
⊕
and
⊗
denote
the Hadamard gate, the XOR operation and the tensor product respectively then (with the presence of a proper
normalizing factor in each expression),
H
N
n|1〉
N
n =
∑
x1,x2,··· ,xn
(−1)x1+x2+···+xn |x1x2 · · ·xn〉
H
N
n|0〉
N
n =
∑
x1,x2,··· ,xn
|x1x2 · · ·xn〉
∴ H
N
n(|1〉
N
n + |0〉
N
n) =
∑
x1
L
x2
L···L xn=0
|x1x2 · · ·xn〉
= (
∑
x1
L
x2
L···Lxs=0
|x1x2 · · ·xs〉)(
∑
xs+1
L
xs+2
L···L xn=0
|xs+1xs+2 · · ·xn〉)
+ (
∑
x1
L
x2
L···Lxs=1
|x1x2 · · ·xs〉)(
∑
xs+1
L
xs+2
L···L xn=1
|xs+1xs+2 · · ·xn〉)
We can observe by symmetry that the above factoring can be infact done for any two groups of sizes s and n − s
respectively. We are now ready to develop our protocol which involves the following steps:
(1) EPR protocol: Along the n− 1 edges of the minimum spanning EPR tree, EPR pairs are created. This involves
pairwise quantum and classical communication between any two parties connected by an edge. Successful
completion ensures that each of the two parties across a given edge share a nearly perfect singlet state 1√
2
(|01〉−
|10〉). At the end of the run, let the minimum number of EPR pairs distilled along any edge of the minimum
spanning EPR tree be 2m.
6(2) The 2m instances of the singlet state are then converted to the triplet state 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), by the Pauli operator
XZ being applied by the second party (called Y) on his qubit.
(3) For each edge, the party Y intimates the protocol leader (say “Lucy”) of the completion of step (2). Lucy is the
one who starts and directs the following protocol for teleporting entanglement. Lucy can be from any of the
two groups.
(4) Entanglement teleportation protocol: Using purely local operations and classical communication (LOCC), the n
parties execute the teleportation protocol of [31], which consumes the n− 1 EPR pairs to produce one instance
of the n-GHZ state state Eq. (3) shared amongst them.
(5) A projective measurement in the diagonal basis is performed by all the parties on their respective qubits.
(6) Lucy decides randomly a set of m bits to be used as check bits, and announces their positions.
(7) All parties from a group assist to get one cbit corresponding to each check bit position by XORing their corre-
sponding check bits. This gives an effective check bit corresponding to each check bit position. The two group
then announce the value of their effective check bits. If too few of these values agree, they abort the protocol.
We can note from the mathematics developed above that the effective check bits should agree after the diagonal
basis measurement. Effective non-check bits are also calculated as above by XORing the non-check bits of the
goup members.
(8) Error correction is done as in for quantum key distribution between two trustful parites.
Proof of unconditional security (Sketch). The crucial element that simplifies the proof of the above protocol is
that it can potentially be reducible to the proof of the security of sharing bipartite entanglement. This is because,
beyond step (1), only local operations and classical communication are involved. We can thus exclude the involvement
of a malicious eavesdropper Eve beyond step (1). Apart from correcting for quantum and classical noise, and the
availability of an authenticated classical channel, the ability to detect Eve in this step suffices to secure the protocol
against Eve.
The problem of secure bipartite entanglement generation has been extensively studied. For example, we may
assume that step (1) is implemented using the Lo-Chau [24] or Modified Lo-Chau protocol [32] (by leaving out the
final measurement step), which have been proven to be unconditionally secure.
Further, we need to mention the role of fault tolerant quantum computation and of quantum error correcting
codes during the execution of entanglement teleportation protocol of Ref. [31] for the following reason: suppose the
probability of error on a bit is p. Then the probability of an error on the bit obtained by XORing all the s group
members’ bits may be larger, given by: P =
∑
r=1,3,5...C(s, r)p
r(1−p)s−r, where C(s, r) is the number of all possible
way selecting r elements from a set of s distinct elements. If P is too close to 0.5, then the effective channel capacity
Ch for the protocol (given by Ch = 1 − H(P ), where H(.) is Shannon entropy) will almost vanish. Therefore, the
quantum part of the protocol implementation should be very good to ensure that P is not too close to 0.5.
Of the XORed 2m raw bits, m bits are first used for getting an estimate of P , by obtaining the Hamming distance
δ between each group’s m-bit check string. If they are mutually too distant, the protocol run is aborted. If δ is not
too great (that is 2δ + 1 ≥ d), it can be corrected with a classical code C(m, k, d), where m is block length, d is
(minimum) code distance and k/m is code rate. Each group decodes its XOR-ed m-bit string to the nearest codeword
in C(m, k, d). This k-bit string is guaranteed with high probability to be identical between the two groups. An binary
enumeration of the 2k codewords of C(m, k, d) can be used as the actual key shared between the two groups.
Recalling the fact that the security of the QKD requires the two involved parties to be honest, one important point
which should be carefully considered is that whether the above reduction of the security proof to the bipartite case
is impervious to the attacks when some subset of parties from one group collude with that from another group. It
seems that the step 7 can ensure that the worst they can do is to sabotage the protocol, however we feel that a more
careful study is required beforing making any such claim and we plan to do this in our future studies.
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